original argument is that, on the assumption that the knowledge operator is monotonic, from (K2) For any true proposition p, there is someone who knows that p.
we can derive (K3) There is someone who knows every truth.
Thus, that there is an omniscient being.
Atheists should agree with Bigelow that the derivation from (B2) to (B3) constitutes a challenge. For, in contrast to (K2), (B2) is plausible, and (B3) is remarkably close to the thesis that there is a God. In this article, I shall indicate three ways to block Bigelow's challenge to atheism. One way makes Bigelow's reasoning, if sound, worthless to the atheist; the other two make it unsound.
2. Bigelow's derivation from (B2) to (B3) runs as follows. Suppose for reductio that (B2) is true and (B3) is false. By (B2), for any contingent truth p something brought it about that p. But by the negation of (B3) for each actual being x, there is some true contingent proposition q(x) that x did not bring it about that it is so. Now form X, the conjunction of all the true contingent propositions of the form (q(x) and x did not bring it about that q(x)). A conjunction of contingent truths is contingent and true. Hence by (B2) something, y, brought it about that X. Then y brought it about that X; and yet, by the negation of (B3), y did not bring it about q(y), which is one of the conjuncts of X. Yet this is absurd. Therefore, if (B2) is true, so is (B3). (Bigelow 2005: 191-92) . 1 The reductio is complete in the presence of the following ancillary assumption:
1 Because this is a reply to his paper, I stick here to Bigelow's presentation of the reductio.
But it should be noted that, in his original reductio about knowledge, Humberstone (1985: 401) appeals to no such conjunction of all the propositions of the form (q(x) and x does not know that q(x)). What Humberstone appeals to is an arbitrary conjunction such that to each knower there corresponds some conjunct of the latter that this knower does not know. That such an arbitrary conjunction can be formed, provided (K2) is true and (K3) is false, is uncontroversial. However, we can question whether X can be formed. For we can wonder whether or not X is a proposition such that something did not bring it about that X. That everything did bring it about that X yields, on the assumption that (B3) is false, the implausible result that nothing is such that it did bring about every conjunct of X even though everything brought it about that X. On the other hand, if there is some z such that z did not bring it about that X, then there is a true proposition of the form (X(z) and z did not bring it about that X(z)), which has X as a conjunct. But since X is the conjunction of all the true propositions of the form (q(x) and x did not bring it about that q(x)), (X(z) and z did not bring it about that X(z)) is a conjunct of X. If so X is a conjunct of a proposition that is a conjunct of X, and so X fails to be well-founded. One may thus uphold (ii) instead of (i) and maintain the following as a principle of action theory:
(FB) for any contingent p, q and any x and y, if x brings it about that p and y brings it about that q, then the mereological fusion of x and y brings it about that p & q.
Suppose that (B2) is true so that, for every contingent p, there is something that brought it about that p. Now form Y, the conjunction of every contingent truth. By (FB) what brought it about that Y is the mereological fusion of all the entities that brought about some contingent truth. If so and if (CB) is true, the mereological fusion of all the entities is our omnificent being: it brought about every contingent truth. Obviously, commitment to the existence of the mereological fusion of all the entities that brought about some contingent truth is compatible with atheism. Therefore, adding (FB) to (B2) and (CB) makes the conclusion of Bigelow's derivation compatible with atheism.
However, that (CB) and (FB) are both true seems unlikely. Suppose they are and suppose again that the Big Bang brought it about that there is matter and that the Georgian government's assault against South Ossetia brought it about that Russia invaded Georgia. By (FB) the mereological fusion of the Big Bang and the Georgian government's assault against South Ossetia brought it about that there is matter and Russia invaded Georgia. And by (CB) the mereological fusion of the Big Bang and the Georgian government's assault against South Ossetia brought it about that there is matter. But the latter is counterintuitive. How could the Georgian government's assault against South Ossetia be part of what brought it about that there is matter? 2 5. It is somewhat counterintuitive to assume that there is a single entity, the Big Bang and myself somehow mereologically fused, that brought it about that there is matter and the saucer is on the table. We may thus reject (ii) and instead uphold (iii): what brings it about that p and what brings it about that q jointly bring it about that p & q. What does it mean to jointly bring it about that some truth is so?
The bringing about operator is an operator of causal grounding: if I bring it about that the light is on by switching the light on, then I causally ground that the light is on; the light is on because of me.
Consider the following operator of partial grounding (Correia 2005: 60) :
(PG) for any x, x partially grounds A iff there are some y, . . . such that x, y, . . . ground A (where each member of the list 'x, y, . . .' is assumed to non-trivially contribute to the grounding of A; i.e. to play a role in the grounding of A).
Then, let an operator of partial bringing about be defined as follows:
(PB) for any contingent p and any x, x partially brings it about that p iff there are some y, . . . such that x, y, . . . ground that p is the case (where grounding is causal).
So a partial cause for a given truth is something which helps bring it about that that truth is so. In contrast, let us say that (B) for any contingent p and any x, x brings it about that p iff x grounds that p is the case (where grounding is causal).
Suppose now that a brings it about that p and b brings it about that q. Then to say that what brings it about that p and what brings it about that q jointly bring it about that p & q means that (JB) each of a and b partially brings it about that p & q but none of them brings it about that p & q.
Suppose that (iii) is true. Then, unless we beg the question in favour of an actual omnificent being, there can be conjunctions of contingent truths such that no actual being did bring it about that they are so, but such that several actual beings jointly brought it about that they are so. Plausibly, that Julius Caesar and John F. Kennedy have been assassinated is one such conjunction. If so, (iii) being assumed, (B2) plausibly fails and should be replaced by the following:
(B2*) There is a finite class of actual beings such that, for any contingent p, if p then some being in this class partially brought it about that p.
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However, nothing like the claim that there is an omnificent being follows from (B2*) and (CB). If we maintain the following counterpart of (CB), then we can at best derive that there is a partial omnificent being; something such that, for every contingent truth, it did help bring it about that that truth is so:
(CB*) For any contingent p, q and for any x, if x partially brings it about that p & q, then x partially brings it about that p and x partially brings it about that q. 3 Instead of (B2*), we might have proposed the following substitute to (B2): there is a finite class of actual beings such that, for any contingent p, if p then either some being in this class brought it about that p or some beings in this class jointly brought it about that p. However, the latter entails (B2*) by definition. Notice also that the theoretical role of (B2) is to assert that every contingent truth is causally grounded and that (B2*) plays this role equally well.
But (CB*) is highly implausible on the assumption that (iii) is true. For assume that the Big Bang and the Georgian government's assault against South Ossetia jointly brought it about that there is matter and Russia invaded Georgia. Then (CB*) tells us that the Georgian government's assault against South Ossetia partially brought it about that there is matter. This is so because, (iii) being assumed, the Georgian government's assault against South Ossetia partially brought it about that there is matter and Russia invaded Georgia. Yet there is no way the Georgian government's assault against South Ossetia can have helped causing that there is matter.
6. I offered three plausible accounts of what brings about conjunctions of contingent truths. I have shown that each of these accounts allows us to undermine Bigelow's derivation of an omnificent being: the first falsifies (CB) and makes Bigelow's derivation unsound; the second makes commitment to an omnificent being compatible with atheism and Bigelow's derivation harmless if sound; according to the third, it is plausible that (B2) fails. Is there a further candidate for what brings about conjunctions of contingent truths that would make Bigelow's derivation sound and its conclusion inconsistent with atheism? Yes, an omnificent supernatural agent. But if one needs to beg the question in favour of a supernatural agent to make it sound and its conclusion incompatible with atheism, Bigelow's derivation of an omnificent being must be regarded as a further failed attempt of a proof that there is a God. 
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